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Abstract 
This paper uses decision-theoretic principles to 
obtain new insights into the assessment and 
updating of probabilities. First, a new 
foundation of Bayesianism is given. It does not 
require infinite atomless uncertainties as did 
Savage's classical result, and can therefore be 
applied to any finite Bayesian network. It 
neither requires linear utility as did de Finetti 's 
classical result, and therefore allows for the 
empirically and normatively desirable risk 
aversion. Finally, by identifying and fixing 
utility in an elementary manner, our result can 
readily be applied to identify methods of 
probability updating. Thus, a decision-theoretic 
foundation is given to the computationally 
efficient method of inductive reasoning 
developed by Rudolf Carnap. Finally, recent 
empirical findings on probability assessments are 
discussed. It leads to suggestions for correcting 
biases in probability assessments, and for an 
alternative to the Dempster-Shafer belief 
functions that avoids the reduction to degeneracy 
after multiple updatings. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the quantification of uncertainty 
through probabilities. In Section 2, we briefly discuss the 
history of Bayesian decision theory in economics, 
psychology, statistics, and artificial intelligence, ending 
with the revived interest generated by Bayesian networks. 
Section 3 presents a foundation of Bayesianism that is 
alternative to the classical foundations by de Finetti 
(1937) and Savage (1954), and that was recently 
introduced in decision theory. A crucial step in this new 
foundation is to identify and fix utility (= - loss), so that 
we can concentrate on the role of probabilities thereafter. 
Section 4 presents a computationally efficient method for 
updating probabilities, namely Rudolf Carnap's method of 
inductive reasoning-! consider this result to be one of 
the most appealing in the Bayesian field. By means of the 
technique of Section 3, we give a decision-foundation for 
Carnap's method. All requirements are expressed 
exclusively in terms of the empirical primitives, decisions, 
while at the same time minimizing the role of utilities so 
that all conditions can readily be interpreted in terms of 
probabilities. This is the main result of this paper. 
Section 5 presents empirical findings, and some recent 
developments on nonadditive measures, from decision 
theory. These suggest violations of the convexity 
conditions that have been traditionally assumed for 
Dempster-Shafer belief functions and other nonadditive 
measures. They also suggest nonadditive measures that 
are alternative to Dempster-Shafer belief functions, and 
avoid the reduction to degeneracy that hampers the 
application of the latter in large networks. 
2 PROBABILITIES AND DECISIONS 
The use of probabilities is traditionally justified through 
Bayesian decision principles, leading to expected utility 
(de Finetti 1937, Savage 1954). There are, however, 
several problems for expected utility. Its probabilities 
must in part be based on subjective assessments, leading 
to practical and even philosophical problems (Fine 1973). 
In addition, there are systematic descriptive violations of 
expected utility. These difficulties have led to non­
Bayesian approaches in economics, psychology, and 
statistics, where nonadditive measures of likelihood play a 
central role (Machina 1982, Schmeidler 1989, Tversky & 
Kahneman 1981). In artificial intelligence, a special class 
of nonadditive measures, the Dempster-Shafer belief 
functions, became popular (Dempster 1967, McCarthy & 
Hayes 1969, Shafer 1976). However, coherent 
manipulations of these measures are problematic. 
Whereas non-Bayesian models still flourish in positive 
sciences such as psychology and economics today, these 
models, and nonadditive measures, have lost popularity in 
artificial intelligence, a field oriented towards optimal 
decision making (Pearl 1988). I hope that the non­
Bayesian models still common in statistics today will 
likewise lose popularity. The revival of Bayesianism also 
revives some old problems of subjective (or, similarly, 
logical) probabilities, regarding their ontological status, 
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their measurement, and the decisions derived from them. 
To the latter we now turn. 
Decision theory is sometimes described as probability 
theory + utility theory, and the use of probabilities in 
Bayesian networks need not entail a commitment to 
Bayesian expected utility. Indeed, in an intriguing paper, 
Machina & Schmeidler (1992) developed a decision 
theory that uses additive probabilities and Bayes' formula 
for updating, but does not commit to Bayesian decisions 
otherwise. I think, however, that this approach cannot 
serve as a basis for Bayesian statistics or Bayesian 
networks. A crucial assumption in the latter two, often 
considered so self-evident that it is assumed implicitly, is 
the likelihood principle. It implies that, once conditioned 
on a realization of a random variable (with a specified 
protocol), the future emerging thereof is not influenced by 
counterfactual values of that random variable. If this 
requirement is violated, models become computationally 
intractable. The requirement is not fulfilled by the model 
of Machina & Schmeidler, or by any other non-Bayesian 
evaluation of sequential decisions that does respect Bayes' 
formula for updating probabilities. Expected utility is, 
therefore, the only decision model to justify the 
manipulation of probabilities in Bayesian networks 
known to me. 
3 A NEW DECISION FOUNDATION OF 
BA YESIANISM 
As an example to frame our results, we consider the case 
where treatment decisions have to be taken for a patient 
with a given set of symptoms. The patient has exactly 
one disease from a set D of diseases, and it is unknown 
which. For simplicity of the presentation, we assume that 
the effects of treatments can be translated into monetary 
terms. This assumption is made solely for simplicity of 
the presentation. All results in this paper can easily be 
adapted to general connected topological spaces, e.g. sets 
of multidimensional descriptions of health states. 
Let e c IR, the outcome set, be a bounded, closed, and 
nondegenerate interval that contains zero. A new 
treatment f yields f(d) E e if the patient has disease d. 
Yielding money means saving money compared to a 
reference case, e.g. a traditional treatment. Formally, 
treatments (acts in Savage's (1954) terminology) map 
diseases (Savage: states of nature) to outcomes. Subsets 
of D are events. We could consider (cr-)algebras of 
events, but for simplicity of the presentation do not do so. 
For an event A, e.g. the set of lung-diseases, (A:x) 
denotes the treatment that yields $x if the disease is 
contained in A, and $0 otherwise. For a treatment f, event 
A, and a. E IR, a.Af denotes the treatment that yields a. for 
all diseases in A, and f(d) for all diseases in �A We 
assume a preference relation "" on the set of treatments, 
with its symmetric part - denoting equivalence and its 
asymmetric part >- strict preference. Preferences and 
decisions are identified throughout this paper, preferences 
reflecting binary decisions and decisions consisting of 
choosing the most preferred treatment. 
(Subjective) expected utility (SEU) holds if there exists a 
(subjective) probability measure P on D and a utility 
function U :  e � IR, such that preferences are compatible 
with the subjective expected utility 
f >-> J 0U(f(d))dP 
of treatments. An event A is null if a.Af-�Af for all a.,�,f, 
and it is nonnul/ otherwise. Under SEU with 
nondegenerate utility, an event is null if and only if its 
probability is zero. 
De Finetti (1937) and Savage ( 1954) provided classical 
foundations of Bayesianism. To explain why I will 
present a different foundation, let us first turn to de 
Finetti's approach. Assume that (A: 106) - 300,000. De 
Finetti proposed to derive probabilities from betting rates, 
and would conclude that P(A) = 3/10. It is, however, 
plausible, that P(A) = 0.5 and that the equivalence reflects 
risk aversion. Then, with � denoting negation or 
complement, (�A: I 06) -300,000 could also be observed, 
leading to P(�A) = 0.3, inconsistent with P(A) = 0.3. De 
Finetti based his method on a book making argument, 
requiring that betting odds cannot be combined into a sure 
loss. Combining the two equivalences just stated in de 
Finetti's way would yield (A:l 06, �A:!06)- 600,000, i.e. 
the decision maker would readily exchange a million for 
sure for $600,000 for sure. This violates the book 
argument, constituting an irrationality according to de 
Finetti's theory. Still, the original preferences are rational. 
De Finetti's approach with combinations of preferences is 
essentially based on the assumption of linear utility, 
which is not reasonable for large amounts. Restricting 
attention to small amounts has the drawback that such 
amounts generate no motivation for taking well­
contemplated decisions. Important decisions typically 
involve large stakes. We will, therefore, propose a 
foundation of Bayesianism that generalizes de Finetti's 
argument to nonlinear utility. 
Savage's (1954) approach does allow for nonlinear utility, 
but requires a rich space of uncertain events, which must 
be infinite and cannot contain atoms (atoms are 
undividable events). In the medical example considered 
in this paper, events would have to be considered that 
specify not only the disease of the patient but also the 
result of any number of flippings of a coin (Savage 1954, 
p. 38). Our approach will not require the use of such 
artificial uncertain events. 
Our foundation of Bayesianism extends a result of 
Kiibberling & Wakker (2002), which was obtained for 
finite disease (state) spaces, to general, possibly infinite, 
disease spaces. Our foundation uses a method for 
measuring utility proposed by Wakker & Deneffe (1996). 
Utility measurement has as yet received little interest in 
the artificial intelligence community; exceptions are 
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Boutilier (2002) and Poupart et a!. (2002). The reason to 
present this method here is that, by quickly solving the 
problem of utility measurement, we can abridge the 
distance between decision theory and probability 
assessment, and concentrate on the latter. Once our 
technique established, a decision foundation for Carnap 's 
method of inductive reasoning will readily follow in 
Section 4. 
Consider equivalences 
a.Af - ��and 
YAf - liAg 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
for a nonnull event A. For a,�, we write a� -* yli 
whenever there exist f,g, and a nonnull event A as in (3.1) 
and (3.2). (3.2) suggests that receiving a. instead of � can 
outweigh the same tradeoffs outside of A as receiving y 
instead of li, i.e. a. instead of � is an equally good 
improvement as y instead of li. Indeed, substituting 
expected utility readily shows that 
a.�-* yli =} U(a.)- U(�) = U(y) - U(li). (3.3) 
The -* relation elicits equalities of utility differences and, 
as can be seen, the whole utility function, given that 
utility is an interval scale. 
The measurements described should not run into 
contradictions. A contradiction results, for instance, if we 
observe, in addition to the two equivalences above, that 
a.'J3 -* yli, for an a' > a.. This happens if we find 
equivalences a.'8v-�8w and y8v-li8w for treatments v,w 
and a nonnull event B, different from f,g,A. Then our 
utility measurements have run into a contradiction, and 
expected utility cannot hold. Tradeoff consistency 
requires that contradictory observations as above do not 
exist. The condition is clearly necessary for expected 
utility. As we will see, it is also sufficient under some 
natural conditions, mainly monotonicity: f ;.= g whenever 
f(d) ;::: g(d) for all d, and a.Af >- �Af for all a. >  �. f, and 
nonnull A. 
THEOREM 3 .I. Let ;.= be a nontrivial binary relation 
defined on the set of treatments, i.e. mappings from a set 
D to a bounded closed interval e. Then the following two 
statements are equivalent. 
(i) Subjective expected utility holds with a strictly 
increasing continuous utility function. 
(ii) The following conditions hold for ;.=: 
D 
(a) Weak ordering (;.= is transitive and complete); 
(b) Monotonicity; 
(c) Supnorm continuity; 
(d) Tradeoff consistency. 
It is remarkable that the existence of probabilities in SEU 
follows, free of charge it seems, if we impose consistency 
of utility measurement through tradeoff consistency. 
Compared with Savage's (1954) result, the above theorem 
permits general disease spaces that can be finite or infinite 
and can have atoms, and does not require a resort to 
repeated flippings of coins. 
Sigma-additivity of the probability measure can be 
ensured by a preference condition requiring that, for each 
nested sequence of events Ai converging to the empty set 
and for each a.>O, there exists a J such that (Ap)-< a. for 
all j <:: J. For infinite sets of diseases it is then desirable to 
consider a a-algebra of events, and only measurable 
treatments. 
The technique described above can be used to elicit 
subjective probabilities without de Finetti 's assumption of 
linear utility. We can in a first stage measure the utility 
function through revelations of the -* relation, as done in 
an experiment by Wakker & Deneffe (1996). In a second 
stage we can derive subjective probabilities from the 
exchange rate of utility units between different events. 
An important reason for developing the utility measurement 
method described above is that it is, contrary to traditional 
methods such as the standard gamble, easily adapted to 
violations of expected utility. With minor adaptations it 
can, for instance, measure utilities correctly if subjects 
process probabilities in non-Bayesian manners and do not 
satisfy additivity. Two experimental papers, Abdellaoui 
(2000) and Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000), adopted this 
procedure. They measured decision weights according to 
the two-stage procedure just described and found that these 
weights ate nonadditive, contrary to the predictions of 
expected utility. 
4 UPDATING 
Bayesian networks ate based on the Bayesian updating of 
probabilities. To reduce the computational burden, it is 
desirable that probabilities ate taken from conjugate 
parametric families. That is, its members should, after 
updating, turn into other members of that same parametric 
family. Well known conjugate families ate the beta 
family and its multinomial extension, the Dirichlet family 
(Wilks 1962). This section provides a foundation for the 
use of such families, building on one of the most 
appealing theorems in the Bayesian field, a theorem by 
the philosopher Rudolf Carnap (1952, 1980). For an 
efficient proof and an historical account of Carnap's 
result, see Zabell (1982). Unfortunately, Carnap's result 
has not been as well known as it deserves to be. 
Carnap expressed his result directly in terms of 
probabilities. (Subjective) probabilities ate, however, not 
directly observable but either have to be derived from 
observed decisions, or have to be obtained from 
introspection and verbal communication, which is a 
controversial empirical basis for a theory. The empirical 
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status of logical probabilities, Carnap 's preferred 
interpretation, is even less clear. We will derive a 
foundation directly in terms of the empirical primitive, i.e. 
decisions. 
We assume that D is finite, D={di>····d,}. We have a data 
set of several patients like the one to be treated now, who 
were treated in the past. One patient was observed at each 
time point i = I, ... , t. At time point t, the diseases of all 
previously observed t patients have become known, 
leading to the evidence E =(E'). 1 , with each E'e { dJ> ... ,d,} t=l 
describing the disease of the ith patient. We consider the 
same outcome set e and treatments as in the preceding 
section, but preferences are conditioned on evidence E, 
and denoted ;..E. Our theory will consider all ;..E for all E 
and t::;; T for some T with 3 ::;; T ::;; oo. Our conditions will 
specify how ;..E changes if E changes. 
The prior preference relation at time point 0, before any 
observation is made, is denoted ;..0. We will assume that 
each ;.. E satisfies all conditions of the preceding sections, 
in particular tradeoff consistency, and can be modeled 
through expected utility. 
Our first assumption about updating is that the utility of 
the outcomes is not affected by the information. Then 
updating only concerns the probabilities. This assumption 
is usually made implicitly, but it is nontrivial and can be 
violated empirically. There can be good reasons for tastes 
to change over time (Christensen-Szalanski 1984). The 
decision condition that is necessary and sufficient for 
identical utilities is that -',E = -•.o for each E, and we will 
assume it. Then utility can be "forgotten" and updating is 
reduced to variations in probabilities, as is the common 
case in Bayesian networks. Denote the probabilities 
conditional on E by p7. 
Under Carnap's method of updating, a positive constant A 
is chosen. Then each P7 is a convex combination of the 
prior probability p� > 0 and the observed relative 
frequency n/N with weights proportional to 'A, and N, the 
total number of observations in E. That is, 
n· 
t..p� +NN 
P7= t..+N (4.1) 
The parameter 'A, indicates the strength of evidence of the 
prior information, relative to the strength of evidence of 
the observations of the other patients. 'A, will be bigger as 
the prior evidence is more reliable, and smaller as the 
other patients are more closely related to the one now 
under consideration. We can interpret 'A, as equivalent to a 
hypothetical sample size. Indeed, (4.1) is the relative 
frequency of a sample consisting of 'A, observations with 
relative frequency p� and N observations with relative 
frequency n/N. 
Carnap's method is appealing, but may seem ad hoc if 
posited without foundation. People are reluctant to 
choose subjective parameters such as p� and t..  There are 
even philosophical objections against the use of such 
subjective quantities (Fine 1973). Questions can be 
raised: Could not this formula, while plausible at face 
value, lead us astray and yield implausible values? Why 
are the operations chosen as they are? Why not take a 
geometrical mean, instead of an arithmetical mean, of p� 
and n/N? How can we convince ourselves of the 
appropriateness of the operations chosen? 
Carnap gave an answer to the preceding questions, taking 
probabilities as primitive. As explained, we shall 
reformulate Carnap's answers directly in terms of 
decisions, so as to obtain a clear normative and empirical 
status of Camap 's induction method. 
We distinguish sharply between our conditions and the 
interpretations thereof. Our conditions should provide a 
sound and uncontroversial empirical basis and, therefore, 
will only concern the ;.. E relations, treatment decisions for 
single patients given fixed evidence. The interpretations 
of the conditions serve to give intuitive insights into the 
conditions, and here we can use whatever we find helpful. 
Here we will freely refer to probabilities and to 
hypothetical decisions concerning sequences of patients. 
Because our conditions only concern conditional 
probabilities given evidence E, and never joint 
probabilities concerning sequences of patients or all of 
them, our formal treatment need not state Bayes' 
conditioning formula explicitly. The interpretation and 
reasonableness of exchangeability, hereafter, will, 
however, be essentially based on Bayes' conditioning. 
Figure I illustrates the conditions discussed next. 
! exchange­
( ability 
l disjoint 
( causality 
FIGURE I. Carnap's conditions. Only the total 
numbers n, of disease d; observed in the patients 
E1, ... ,E1 matter. For disease di> only the numbers 
n; and Li*' ni matter. 
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Our first condition is positive relatedness of the 
observations: 
(4.2) 
Any new observation of disease dio added to the evidence 
E already available, makes it more attractive to gain $1 if 
the patient now to be treated will have disease di. We 
interpret ( 4.2) as meaning that di is considered more likely 
after an extra observation di. This condition will be 
violated in specific cases, e.g. in sampling without 
replacement, where observations are related negatively. 
Our main theorem, in fact, goes through with minor 
adaptations if observations are negatively related, and. we assume Eq. 4.2 mostly for simplicity of the presentation. 
The essential mathematical point is that the observations 
are not independent, i.e. the connections with di at time 
t+ 1 in Figure 1 should be maintained. Let us assume 
henceforth that positive relatedness is appropriate in our 
empirical domain. 
For the interpretation of the next condition, we start by 
defining the joint probability of a sequence of 
observations ( di 1, ... ,di,) through the product of conditional 
0 E'l E't-1 h h E' . t Probabilities p. x p . x ... x p . , w ere eac i cons1s s 
' 
1 1 12 1t 
of the first j observations (dip ... ,di)· The product of 
probabilities just defined requires, for a proper 
interpretation, Bayes' conditioning. Because these 
probabilities play a role only in the interpretation of the 
following condition, and not in the formal theory, our 
formal framework need not specify Bayes' conditioning. 
For E = (E�o .... E,), (E,di) denotes (E�o ... ,E,,E,.I) with E..1 = 
�. (E,diA) denotes (E�o .... E,,E,.�oE.d where further�ore 
E,.2 = dj, etc. Our next decision principle charactenzes 
exchangeability. Consider equivalences 
(dj:1) _(E,dj) X and (di:x) _E y. (4.3) 
We start from evidence E. The first equivalence states 
that, if an extra observation di is made, then gaining $1 
conditional on d· is equivalent to gaining $x for sure. J 
d' From the perspective of evidence E prece mg any extra 
observation di, this equivalence can be reinterpreted as an 
equivalence between: 
• gaining $1 if first di is observed and then di, and 
gaining nothing if the next observation is not di; 
• gaining $x always if first di is observed, and gaining 
nothing if the next observation is not di. 
Whereas our formal model, and conditions, only consider 
,_,E, decisions regarding one patient, being the next pati�nt, 
the reinterpreted equivalence, serving only to clarify, 
refers to hypothetical decisions based on two successive 
patients. The second equivalence in Eq. 4.? .simply. stat�s that gaining $y for sure is equivalent to gammg $x If di IS 
observed, all given E. Combining the second and 
reinterpreted first equivalences suggests that receiving $y 
for sure is equivalent to receiving $1 if first di is observed 
and then di. 
Next consider the two equivalences 
(di:1) _(E,djl x' and (di:x) _E y'. (4.4) 
They can be interpreted similarly as Eq. 4.3, suggesting 
that receiving $y' for sure is equivalent to receiving $1 if 
first d· is observed and then di. Exchangeability requires 
that /in (4.3) and y' in (4.4) are identical. This condition 
suggests that first observing di and then di is as probable 
as first observing di and then di. By repeated application, 
the condition implies that the probability of a sequence of 
observations depends only on the number of observations 
of each disease in the sequence, and not on the order in 
which these observations were made. The condition, 
therefore, agrees with the exchangeability condition 
common in Bayesian statistics. It implies that the 
sampling of patients could as well have been done in an 
unordered manner. Although the condition can be 
violated if causes change over time, let us assume that the 
condition is appropriate in our empirical domain. 
The decision conditions considered so far, positive 
relatedness and exchangeability, are directly related to 
assumptions common in statistics. The following 
condition is less common, and is characteristic of Carnap's 
result. It amounts to the assumption that there are no 
common causes for different diseases, i.e. disease d 1 is 
equally probable after observing d2 as after observing d3. 
Formally, disjoint causality means that, for all E and 
distinct i,j,k, 
(di: 1) _(E,dj) X => (di: 1) _(E,dk) X. (4.5) 
Under exchangeability, it only matters for the conditional 
probability of a disease di how many times we observed di 
and -x!io and not whether among the -xli observations there 
were more of one disease or of another. For s = 2, the 
condition is vacuously satisfied and Theorem 4.1 will not 
apply to s=2. 
FIGURE 2. Violation of 
disjoint causality. 
Disjoint causality will not be appropriate in many 
situations. The causal configuration in Figure 2 is a 
typical case. If there is a common cause for diseases d 1 
and d2, then an observation of d2 can, more than an 
observation d3, be indicative of d1 in the future, and 
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disjoint causality is violated. Disjoint causality is 
plausible if all diseases are generated by independently 
operating families of bacterias, to whom patients are 
delivered on a first-come-first-serve basis. 
Let us assume that disjoint causality is reasonable in our 
empirical domain. One disease is not closer to a second 
than to a third, and we take diseases as nominal. There is 
no structure on the set of diseases that we can use in our 
inferences. 
The following theorem may come as a surprise. The first 
issue raised above, the reasonableness and empirical 
meaning of Camap's inductive method, was hard to 
assess. The meaning of its quantities was not directly 
related to observable primitives, and the method seemed 
to be ad hoc. The second issue raised was the 
reasonableness of a number of conditions regarding the 
structure of our reasoning and our decisions, depicted in 
Figure 1 .  They were all stated directly i n  terms of 
decisions, and their empirical status was clear. We 
assumed that these conditions are appropriate in our 
particular empirical domain. As it turns out, the two 
issues raised are equivalent, and Camap's inductive 
method is appropriate if and only if the conditions 
discussed are appropriate. 
THEOREM 4.1. Assume s�3. The following two 
statements are equivalent. 
(i) Camap's inductive method (Eq. 4.1) holds, where "'E 
maximizes subjective expected utility with respect to the 
P7 > 0 and a strictly increasing continuous utility function 
U. 
(ii) Each "'E satisfies the conditions of Statement (ii) in 
Theorem 3. 1 ,  with all diseases nonnull. Further, the 
following conditions are satisfied. 
(a) -',E = -•.o for each E; 
(b) Positive relatedness of the observations; 
(c) Exchangeability; 
(d) Disjoint causality of the diseases. 
The probabilities and the number A in Camap's method 
are uniquely determined through "'E· 
D 
An intelligent client without trammg in subjective 
probabilities can more easily be convinced through 
Statement (ii) than through Statement (i). In Theorem 
4.1, Camap's method, with its subjective and 
philosophically controversial quantities, follows from a 
number of empirically meaningful claims as a logical 
necessity, without further resort to philosophical 
arguments. Decision foundations for other updating 
systems, such as for sets of probabilities (Boutilier, 
Friedman, & Halpern 2002), remains a topic for future 
research. 
Camap 's formula has many attractive features. It shows 
how to integrate subject-matter information (p�) and 
statistical information (n;IN). The subject-matter 
information p� can be interpreted as being equally 
informative as A observations. If many observations 
become available, the role of the problematic subjective 
parameters can be ignored and the observed relative 
frequency decides. The formula can also be used for 
combining two pieces of evidence instead of updating 
(Halpern & Fagin 1992), where the weight of each piece 
is calibrated through a hypothetical number of 
observations that are considered equally informative. 
5 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This section discusses empirical findings regarding 
subjective probabilities derived from decisions. Section 3 
suggested a simple procedure for measuring utility, which 
can subsequently be used to measure subjective 
probabilities. It is not guaranteed empirically that the 
quantities measured will behave like probabilities­
Abdellaoui (2000) and Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000) indeed 
found deviations. We shall, therefore, use the symbol W 
and not P to denote the results of these measurements. 
This section is informal and we will, therefore, not specify 
the nonexpected utility theories underlying our claims. It 
suffices to note that treatments (A:x) are evaluated 
through W(A)U(x) where W may be a nonadditive 
measure, e.g. a Dempster-Shafer belief function, and 
where, for convenience, U(O)=O. Then W(A)=U(x)IU(l) 
can be derived from an observed preference (A:1)-x. For 
simplicity, we only consider nonnegative outcomes. 
A first point of concern under violations of Bayesianism 
may be that the measurements of utility of Section 3 need 
no longer be valid. Fortunately, these measurements are 
easily adapted to be robust to the violations of expected 
utility mostly studied today (Wakker & Deneffe 1 996). 
We will, therefore, concentrate on the deviations from 
additivity comprised in W. 
Tversky & Fox ( 1995) conjectured a two-stage model W= 
w o cp, where <p is a direct psychological judgment of 
probability, and w turns judgments of probability into 
decision weights. The component w can be measured 
from the special cases where objective probabilities of 
events are known, so that <p is the identity. The shape of 
w that is mostly conjectured by economists and by the 
artificial intelligence community is convexity. This 
conjecture is based on theoretical arguments, because 
convexity is related to conservative and pessimistic risk 
attitudes and to the existence of equilibria. Convexity of 
w enhances convexity of W, implying for instance that 
W(AvB) � W(A) + W(B) (superadditivity) (5.1) 
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for disjoint events A,B, a condition satisfied by the 
Dempster-Shafer belief functions. 
Psychologists are empirically oriented and, rather than 
conjecture shapes of W based on theoretical or normative 
arguments, they carried out measurements to see what w 
and W look like empirically. The prevailing shape for w 
that was found is different from what was conjectured 
elsewhere, and is depicted in Figure 3 (Abdellaoui 2000, 
Bleichrodt & Pinto 2000, Tversky & Fox 1995). 
Fig. 3. 
function. 
�I 
p 
The common weighting 
Small probabilities are overweighted, contrary to 
convexity as mostly assumed in the literature. For 
probabilities p, q that are small or moderate, we have 
w(p+q) ::; w(p) + w(q) (subadditivity) . (5.2) 
The w component of W enhances subadditivity of W, 
W(AuB) ::; W(A) + W(B) (5.3) 
for disjoint events A,B, contrary to the common 
assumptions about belief functions etc. as in Eq. 5.1 .  
A natural idea when inferring probabilities from 
decisions, is to first derive W and w directly from 
decisions, then to "correct" W for w, that is, to take <p = 
winvw as the judgment of the expert. A question is 
whether all nonlinearity in W is due to w, so that winvw 
can play the role of a Bayesian belief. The empirical 
findings so far suggest that this is not so (Tversky & Fox 
1 995). Much, even most, of the deviation from 
Bayesianism lies in the estimation of unknown 
probabilities <p. The domain of <p, as of W, is the set of 
events and not the unit interval and, therefore, no graph of 
<p or W can be drawn. Still, <p's and W's deviations from 
linearity are of the same nature as those of w depicted in 
Figure 3. Tversky & Wakker (1995) five a formal 
definition, called bounded subadditivity. 
For those who do not accept the Bayesian paradigm as 
normative, the developments just described lead to 
suggestions for nonadditive measures alternative to the 
Dempster-Shafer belief functions. A difficulty with the 
latter is that after iterated updatings they lead to 
degenerate assignments, with the belief of most events 
converging to zero, or to one if the, dual, plausibility 
functions are used. Such degenerate quantifications 
resulting from the absence of information can no more be 
updated flexibly if valuable information arrives after. The 
nonadditive measures with properties similar to those 
depicted in Figure 3, tend to some interior value, such as 
0.5 in the case of symmetry, and not to zero or one. Such 
quantifications are flexibly updated when valuable 
information starts arriving at some stage, thus avoid one 
of the major problems of belief functions. 
The shape of Figure 3, and its analogue for <p and W, 
suggest a lack of sensitivity towards varying degrees of 
uncertainty because the function is too shallow in the 
middle. This constitutes a cognitive reason for deviating 
from Bayesianism, instead of the motivational reason 
suggested by the pessimism that has been assumed in 
economics and artificial intelligence so far. The shape in 
Figure 3 seems to better reflect absence of information 
than convexity, both psychologically and 
computationally. Also linguistically, absence of 
information is expressed by "fifty-fifty" rather than by 
degenerate assessments (Fischhoff & Bruine de Bruin 
1999). Although the phenomena of subadditivity and 
Figure 3 did not originate from conceptual considerations, 
but from inspections of data, these phenomena do suggest 
new concepts such as degrees of sensitivity towards 
information rather than degrees of conservativeness or 
pessimism. 
For those who, like the author, consider the Bayesian 
paradigm as normative, the developments sketched in this 
section suggest how to correct expert judgments when 
elicited from (hypothetical) decisions, so as to bring them 
closer to the Bayesian approach. 
To end this discussion of empirical findings, I briefly 
mention support theory for direct judgments of 
probabilities that are not revealed through decisions. The 
psychologist Amos Tversky developed this theory in the 
last years of his life (Tversky & Koehler 1994). A typical 
finding of support theory is, again, subadditivity, which 
increases with refinements. That is, for disjoint events Ai, 
(5.4) 
increases as n increases. 
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